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P
ractitioners of the special sciences, such as psychology, bi-
ology, or geography, articulate generalizations that seem to dif-
fer in important respects from the laws that physicists present.
Only the former tolerate exceptions, and we can mark this fact by say-
ing that they are generalizations that hold other things equal, or ceteris
paribus. These are the generalizations that are traditionally called cp-
laws, though I’ll argue below that this label is misleading.
CP-laws have played a prominent role in several debates in the phi-
losophy of science, usually because there is unclarity, and hence dis-
agreement, about what they say. Let me make this more precise. We
can regiment statements of laws into the form it is a law that p. Initial
discussions of laws of nature focused on analyzing the nomic opera-
tor it is a law that, trying to determine which claims, if true, are (or
express) laws of nature.1 To take one well-known example, one might
want to know why all uranium spheres are less than 100,000km in diameter
expresses a law, while the similar all gold spheres are less than 100,000km
in diameter does not. In these examples, the content of the claim that is
said to be a law is quite transparent, so we can focus immediately on
what makes one but not the other a potential law. However, when p
in the schema it is a law that p is replaced by a sentence containing the
locution ceteris paribus, it is not at all clear what proposition is said to
be a law.
This is reﬂected in the debates in which cp-laws have ﬁgured promi-
nently. Two examples concern explanation and the nature of theories.
In the case of explanation, opponents of the DN-account have argued
that cp-laws are unsuited to appear in deductively subsuming explana-
tions, but that the special sciences nonetheless are capable of offering
serious explanations of the phenomena they study.2 In the case of the-
ories, opponents of the view that theories are, or are properly modeled
by, deductively closed axiomatic systems have argued that cp-laws are
1. See, e.g., Armstrong (1983); Hempel (1965); Lewis (1973b); Nagel (1979);
Van Fraassen (1980, 1989).
2. See, e.g., Dray (1957) and Rosenberg (2001a,b).bernhard nickel Ceteris Paribus Laws: Generics and Natural Kinds
unsuited to enter into the deductive relations that this view would
require of them.3 In both cases, it is a problem about the deductive
relations cp-laws enter into, and thus about the proposition said to be
a law, that animates the debate.
For this reason, much of the debate about cp-laws has focused on
the question how we should characterize the relevant generalization.
The main burden of this paper is to make a two-fold contribution to
this literature, one methodological, the other more directly substantive.
I will argue that in stating the relevant generalizations, practitioners of
the special sciences make use of a linguistic resource familiar from or-
dinary language, speciﬁcally, genericity. We can thus make progress
on understanding cp-laws by appealing to the semantics of natural
language at several crucial junctures. That is the methodological aim.
More substantively, I will focus on one kind of genericity we can use in
stating some cp-laws, what I’ll call characterizing sentences, and give their
truth-conditions. On my proposal, the cp-laws we state using charac-
terizing sentences are very closely connected to the natural kinds of
the discipline in which they are articulated. I’ll argue that on this pro-
posal, we can account for several important aspects of these cp-laws,
some familiar, some new.
I’ll begin by delimiting the aims of this paper more precisely in
§1. I then turn to the debate between Pietroski and Rey (1995) on the
one hand and Woodward (2002) on the other, which will serve as a
jumping off point for my own account (§2). §3 is devoted to making
the connection between cp-laws and natural language more precise
and to focusing on the more speciﬁc target of analysis for the rest of
the paper. §4 introduces and motivates the view of natural kinds I will
appeal to and explains their relationship to characterizing sentences.
Throughout, I won’t take a stand on whether we should take cp-
laws to be genuine laws. My concern is exclusively with getting clear
on the broadly semantic issues. To mark this fact in my terminology, I’ll
discuss what I’ll call cp-generalizations. A cp-generalization is a sentence
3. See Giere (1988a,b, 1999) and Cartwright (1983, 1989, 1995, 1999).
that can take the place of p in the regimentation it is a law that p, and
when it does, the instance of the schema expresses a purported cp-law.
1. CP-Generalizations: Some Problems
I have so far spoken of an unclarity about what a cp-generalization
expresses. In order to focus the investigation, we need to sharpen the
intuitive sense of puzzlement into more precise issues. This is particu-
larly important for me since the account I will offer is non-reductive.
In order to evaluate whether it succeeds, I need to say just what its
aims are. In this section, I introduce two of them, and then situate my
account in relation to the most common way of stating the problem of
cp-generalizations. §2 introduces a third phenomenon to be accounted
for.
The most striking feature of cp-generalizations is the fact that they
tolerate exceptions. The exceptions to a cp-generalization are cases that
are compatible with that generalization’s truth, but which would refute
the corresponding universal generalization. Exceptions contrast with
counterexamples to the cp-generalization which are incompatible with
its truth.
A natural, albeit unsuccessful, way of trying to say what a cp-
generalization means appends a clause headed by unless to a universal
generalization derived from the cp-generalization. An example will
help to make the point. We might begin with (1).
(1) Ceteris paribus, all ravens are black.
(1) does not have the same force as the corresponding universal gener-
alization all ravens are black, since (1) is true, while the simple universal
is false, as witnessed for example by albinos. A more promising at-
tempt at saying what (1) amounts to without helping ourselves to the
ceteris paribus locution is (2).
(2) All ravens are black, unless they are albinos.
However, (2) does not capture the force of (1) either, since ravens that
are non-black because of the environmental conditions they experi-
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help to make the point. We might begin with (1).
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(1) does not have the same force as the corresponding universal gener-
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is false, as witnessed for example by albinos. A more promising at-
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ence, rather than the genetic endowment they are born with, would
falsify (2) without intuitively leading us to reject (1). And it seems as
if, for any way of adding more qualiﬁcations to the unless-clause, we
can come up with more mere exceptions we have not yet captured.
Let’s call such an unless-clause open-ended, and let’s call the cp-gener-
alization that gives rise to such an unless-clause open-ended, as well.4
Of course, there are some ways of listing the exceptions that does not
result in an open-ended unless-clause. We could say that ravens are
black unless they are abnormal. By itself, this does not represent any
advance beyond (1). But if we do not help ourselves to these expres-
sions, the list of merely apparent exceptions is open-ended.
This observation suggests that we won’t make progress on saying
what a cp-generalization means simply by listing exceptions. It also
introduces the ﬁrst phenomenon to be accounted for: why are cp-
generalizations open-ended, and what uniﬁes the apparently hetero-
geneous class of a cp-generalization’s exceptions?
Let me add another striking feature that is not usually discussed,
but that is also concerned with the contrast between exceptions and
counter-examples. The point is easiest to state with respect to the con-
trast between cp-generalizations and straightforward universal gen-
eralizations. The former, but not the latter, are insensitive to small
changes in the way the world is. (1) is true in the actual world, and
it would still be true if there happened to be one or a few more non-
black ravens than there actually are. By contrast, a true universal gen-
eralization all As are Bs would be false if there was an extra A that was
not B. In order to ﬁnd a pair of worlds such that a cp-generalization is
true with respect to one, false with respect to the other, the two worlds
need to differ in very signiﬁcant respects. For example, a world that
clearly falsiﬁes (1) is a world in which ravens have evolved to have the
color scheme of Crimson Rosellas.
4. The problem concerns the potential exceptions to the generalization. Even
if at some point only black ravens exist, (1) still poses the same problem,
since it would not be falsiﬁed by certain non-black ravens.
CP-generalizations also contrast with other run-of-the-mill gener-
alizations, such as ones of the form most As are Bs. The truth-value of
such a claim is, in many cases, robust with respect to adding a single
A that is not B. That most students are under forty years old would
remain true even if there was another student over forty. However, As
that are not Bs are all potential counter-examples to the majority claim.
The robustness of the truth of the claim derives from the fact that we
need enough counter-examples in order to falsify it. By contrast, a cp-
generalization ceteris paribus, all As are Bs that is true in the actual world
would not only remain true if there was an extra A that wasn’t B, that
extra A would simply be another exception. The very status of an A
that is not a B as exception or counterexample depends on larger pat-
terns in the world. This gives us our second explanandum: why is the
truth of cp-generalizations only sensitive to large-scale changes?
I want to end this section by situating my account with respect to
the way the problem of cp-generalizations is most commonly stated
in the literature. Many theorists argue that the open-endedness of cp-
generalizations threatens them with triviality.5 A generalization is non-
trivial if there could be counterexamples, i.e., if there are circumstances
that would falsify it. But since the list of exceptions to a cp-generaliza-
tion is open-ended, anything could be covered by that list. In that case,
there couldn’t be any counterexamples (not even potentially), making
the generalization trivial. That is the triviality worry. Applied to my
example, it says that (1) amounts to no more than all ravens are black,
unless they aren’t.
The triviality worry is by far the most important point of debate
in the literature on cp-generalizations. A subsidiary one focuses on
epistemic considerations, concerning the claim that cp-generalizations
5. Pietroski and Rey (1995, 87) give a prominent statement. Woodward, who
argues that there is a signiﬁcant problem with cp-generalizations, cites this
passage as stating the problem (Woodward, 2002, 308). Other authors who
also take triviality to be the main problem include: Earman and Roberts
(1999), Earman et al. (2002), Fodor (1991), Mott (1992), Schiffer (1991),
Schurz (2001, 2002), and Silverberg (1996).
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cannot be empirically conﬁrmed or disconﬁrmed.6 Any observed case
that does not conform to the generalization, no matter what, could
potentially be counted among the exceptions because there are no sig-
niﬁcant constraints on them. That makes an “honest test” impossible.
But this is really just the triviality worry again. Both turn on the idea
that there are no constraints on the exceptions. The concern about con-
ﬁrmation stands and falls with the triviality worry, and I won’t discuss
it separately here.
Since I aim to give semantics for at least some cp-generalizations on
which they are non-trivial, I implicitly respond to the triviality worry,
as well. However, I want to be explicit about one respect in which I
do not so much answer that worry as assume that it is baseless. As
will emerge in §4, the account I offer is non-reductive. Thus, someone
who takes the triviality worry to not just show that we need to under-
stand cp-generalizations better, but that they might be fundamentally
defective and hence must be elucidated by offering a reductive seman-
tics, will ﬁnd my account unsatisfying. The notions I appeal to will
strike such a theorist as requiring as much explication and defense as
cp-generalizations did in the ﬁrst place. Against this demand for a re-
ductive account of cp-generalizations, one couched only in terms that
are better understood by some relevant standard, I want to anticipate
a point I will argue for later. CP-generalizations are often, and most
naturally, stated using natural language, and in general, demanding
reductive semantics for natural language is an unreasonably high bar
to set.
2. Pietroski & Rey vs. Woodward
Pietroski and Rey explicitly address the triviality worry in their
(1995), but much of what they say is a substantive theory of cp-
generalizations. In discussing their view I pursue two aims, one posi-
tive, one negative. On the positive side, I want to highlight a basic mo-
tivating thought that I agree with: cp-generalizations reﬂect the needs
6. See for example Earman et al. (2002, 293) and Schurz (2002, 360-2).
of theorizing in sciences that investigate complex phenomena. I’ll also
show that their view goes some way towards illuminating the strik-
ing features I just mentioned, since it offers a ready account of the
open-endedness of cp-generalizations. However, I’ll argue on the neg-
ative side that their view faces some important shortcomings. First, it
does not offer an account of why the truth-value of cp-generalizations
is only robust with respect to small-scale changes, not large scale
ones. And second, I’ll point out various semantic relations among
cp-generalizations, relations of compatibility and incompatibility, that
their account does not capture, but that a more complete semantics for
cp-generalizations needs to handle. This discussion will set the stage
for the rest of the paper.
2.1 The View
Pietroski and Rey introduce their view thus.
[S]cientists state cp-laws in an attempt to focus on par-
ticular factors (e.g., natural selection) and thereby ‘carve’
complex phenomena (e.g. the evolution of populations) in
a theoretically important way.7
The idea that a theoretically important carving of the phenomena a
scientiﬁc discipline investigates is at the heart of the practice of using
cp-generalizations is one that I want to pursue, as well. It obviously
needs to be spelled out, and here is the next step Pietroski and Rey
take.
Our own view is motivated by the following general con-
sideration: the emergence of any theoretically interesting
science requires considerable abstraction and idealization.
The actual world is too complex to study all at once, so
one proceeds by ignoring some aspects of the world in or-
der to understand others. We idealize away from friction,
7. Pietroski and Rey (1995, 92).
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electric charge, and nuclear forces, for example, when we
seek to understand the effect of gravity on the motion
of bodies. However, such abstraction guarantees a loss of
descriptive adequacy in any generalization we lay down,
since actual bodies are always affected by, e.g., friction, at
least a little.8
Let me connect these remarks to the concrete semantic proposal. In the
ﬁrst instance, Pietroski and Rey do not wish to give truth-conditions
for cp-generalizations. Rather, they want to state a condition that, if
satisﬁed by a cp-generalization, ensures that it is non-trivial. However,
the two tasks are not really separate, since a cp-generalization is non-
trivial just in case its truth-conditions cannot be satisﬁed trivially. And
that means that, in stating a non-triviality condition, Pietroski and Rey
state a necessary condition on the truth of a cp-generalization.9
As the quotes make clear, Pietroski and Rey couch a lot of their
discussion in terms of examples from simple physics, such as ideal
gases. I’ll make use of a similar example, that of springs, but the points
generalize. The relevant cp-generalization about springs states that the
period of a spring depends on the mass of a suspended object m and
a spring-constant k according to a simple formula, captured in this
generalization.
(3) (Ceteris paribus), all springs have a period determined by T =
2p
q
m
k .
There are conditions under which (3) fails to accurately describe the
period of a given spring: the mass might be subject to friction-forces,
or it might, if made of iron, be subject to a magnet placed in its vicinity
to either increase or decrease its period. Nonetheless, one might think,
the generalization (3) gets at something important. And at any rate,
8. Pietroski and Rey (1995, 89).
9. They go on to make some passing remarks about how to strengthen the
condition to be sufﬁcient, as well. I’ll indicate that below.
whatever qualms one may have about calling (3) a law, it does not
seem to be a triviality.
Here, according to Pietroski and Rey, is the relevant feature that
accounts for its non-vacuity, and the non-vacuity of other acceptable
cp-generalizations. Certain cases covered by the generalization, i.e.,
certain springs, conform to it. Other cases, i.e., other springs, do not.
In the latter cases, however, we can explain why any given failure to
conform to (3) is a failure by citing one or more factors that do inde-
pendent explanatory work. To put this in terms of the examples I’ve
already mentioned, if the period of a spring fails to conform to (3)
because the massive object is made of iron and subject to a magnetic
ﬁeld, then we’ve explained (or at least can explain) why that particu-
lar spring fails to conform to (3) by citing the magnetic ﬁeld. Appeals
to that magnetic ﬁeld do independent explanatory work, such as ex-
plaining why a compass-needle in the vicinity turns in a particular
direction.
More generally, a cp-generalization is non-vacuous if the following
is a necessary condition for its truth: all exceptions to the generaliza-
tion can be explained away citing only independently motivated causal
factors.10 To see how this condition works to exclude a putatively true
cp-generalization whose acceptability quite clearly has been bought at
the price of trivialization, consider (4) about ESP.
(4) (Ceteris paribus), on all occasions on which Jones tries to divine
the future, she is successful.
Faced with a non-conforming case, i.e., Jones’ failure to see the future
coming, the proponent of (4) might explain away the failure by citing
a factor that does no independent work, such as psychic static. If she
countenances any such kinds of interferences, (4) is trivialized. Then
again, she might only cite factors that do independent explanatory
10. See Pietroski and Rey (1995, 92) for their more elaborate statement of the
view. There, they seem to suggest that this condition might be sufﬁcient,
as well. One of the upshots of the argument below is that it cannot be
sufﬁcient.
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q
m
k .
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whatever qualms one may have about calling (3) a law, it does not
seem to be a triviality.
Here, according to Pietroski and Rey, is the relevant feature that
accounts for its non-vacuity, and the non-vacuity of other acceptable
cp-generalizations. Certain cases covered by the generalization, i.e.,
certain springs, conform to it. Other cases, i.e., other springs, do not.
In the latter cases, however, we can explain why any given failure to
conform to (3) is a failure by citing one or more factors that do inde-
pendent explanatory work. To put this in terms of the examples I’ve
already mentioned, if the period of a spring fails to conform to (3)
because the massive object is made of iron and subject to a magnetic
ﬁeld, then we’ve explained (or at least can explain) why that particu-
lar spring fails to conform to (3) by citing the magnetic ﬁeld. Appeals
to that magnetic ﬁeld do independent explanatory work, such as ex-
plaining why a compass-needle in the vicinity turns in a particular
direction.
More generally, a cp-generalization is non-vacuous if the following
is a necessary condition for its truth: all exceptions to the generaliza-
tion can be explained away citing only independently motivated causal
factors.10 To see how this condition works to exclude a putatively true
cp-generalization whose acceptability quite clearly has been bought at
the price of trivialization, consider (4) about ESP.
(4) (Ceteris paribus), on all occasions on which Jones tries to divine
the future, she is successful.
Faced with a non-conforming case, i.e., Jones’ failure to see the future
coming, the proponent of (4) might explain away the failure by citing
a factor that does no independent work, such as psychic static. If she
countenances any such kinds of interferences, (4) is trivialized. Then
again, she might only cite factors that do independent explanatory
10. See Pietroski and Rey (1995, 92) for their more elaborate statement of the
view. There, they seem to suggest that this condition might be sufﬁcient,
as well. One of the upshots of the argument below is that it cannot be
sufﬁcient.
philosophers’ imprint - 5 - vol. 10, no. 6 (july 2010)bernhard nickel Ceteris Paribus Laws: Generics and Natural Kinds
work, such as sunspots or migraines. In that case, the putative cp-
generalization may not be trivialized, but simply false if it turns out
that sunspots or migraines don’t actually explain the failure.
Pietroski and Rey do a lot to give an account of what independent
explanatory work amounts to, but I will simply grant them the notion,
since the points I will make now do not rely on any controversial way
of interpreting it.
2.2 Interference, Causation, and Open-Endedness
I’ll begin by showing that implicit in the view of Pietroski and Rey is
an explanation for why cp-generalizations are open-ended in the sense
of §1. To make this more obvious, I’ll say a little more about how the
particular account they provide is related to the programmatic remarks
I quoted at the beginning of this discussion.
As they say there, cp-laws reﬂect idealizations. In very many cases,
an idealization of a situation we’re investigating is a simpliﬁed version
of it.11 Most importantly, the idealization will contain far fewer causal
factors than the original situation. In the idealization, these factors are
the only ones involved in bringing about an effect. Given this under-
standing of idealizations, we might put the connection between cp-
generalizations and idealizations like this. A cp-generalization about a
kind of thing—springs, for instance—is true iff there is an idealization
that takes into account some of the factors potentially acting on things
of that kind, and in the idealization those factors bring about the state
of affairs described by the generalization, and in some members of the
kind, these causal factors exhaust the causally relevant ones. This is
why, in a non-trivial cp-generalization, we can always explain why an
11. Obviously, this is not supposed to do justice to the wide range of things
one might call an idealization in the sciences, let alone the closely related
notion of a model. But I trust that the description in the text is true of
an important subclass of idealizations. For at least some other things that
are reasonably counted among idealizations or models, see Mäki (2002);
Morrison and Morgan (1999).
exception occurs by citing an independent causal or explanatory fac-
tor. An exception occurs only if a particular situation contains causal
factors that differ from those in the idealization. That’s why we can
point to these factors to explain the occurrence.
Recall now that cp-generalizations are open-ended if the list of
merely apparent exceptions is heterogeneous and open-ended. If Piet-
roski and Rey are right, then this is unsurprising. A mere exception,
i.e., something that falls short of a counterexample, arises because a
causal factor operates on a member of the kind mentioned in the gen-
eralization that differs from those countenanced in the underlying ide-
alization and thus forces that object to behave in a way that doesn’t
conform to the generalization. But the form that such causal inﬂu-
ences can take are legion, and they need not have anything in common
except that they make the object deviate from the course predicted by
the underlying idealization.12
2.3 Woodward’s Charges
I now want to raise some questions a semantic theory for cp-
generalizations should answer that the account of Pietroski and Rey
leaves open. I’ll argue that many cp-generalizations satisfy the neces-
sary condition on their truth, but are nonetheless false. In fact, we can
discern patterns of incompatibility among these generalizations, and
an adequate semantics needs to predict these patterns. Given the lim-
12. By linking cp-generalizations to idealizations, we can account for another
feature of cp-generalizations. They exhibit what we may call deviant con-
formers: members of the kind at issue that satisfy the predicate of the gen-
eralization but do so in a deviant way. Put in terms of my example re-
garding springs, a spring might have a period described by T = 2p
q
m
k ,
but do so because a number of disturbing factors happen to cancel each
other out. Though the spring is in a high-friction medium, the oscillating
object is accelerated by an outside force to counter the effects of friction.
Intuitively, such a case falls outside of the scope of the cp-generalization
about springs. We have a ready explanation of this fact if we assume that
the cp-generalization is closely tied to a particular idealization. The one to
which the cp-generalization about springs is tied presumably countenances
neither the high-friction medium nor the external force.
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other out. Though the spring is in a high-friction medium, the oscillating
object is accelerated by an outside force to counter the effects of friction.
Intuitively, such a case falls outside of the scope of the cp-generalization
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ited aims of Pietroski and Rey, this is not an objection. It is, rather, a
reason to look further.
The necessary condition Pietroski and Rey impose is essentially ex-
istential. In order for a cp-generalization to be non-trivial, it is sufﬁcient
that there is a suitable idealization. And in general, existential claims
are compatible with other existential claims about the same things.
Hence, for any idealization, there is a corresponding non-trivial cp-
generalization. Return to the example of springs. In some springs, the
relevant causal and explanatory factors are exhausted by the weight
of the massive object and the spring constant, and in those cases, the
period is given by the formula in (3), which is why (3) is true. In some
other springs, the relevant causal and explanatory factors include those
two and others besides, such as the presence of a magnetic ﬁeld with a
particular strength and orientation. In those cases, a different formula
applies, call it T0. Consider the corresponding cp-generalization (5).
(5) (Ceteris paribus), all springs have a period determined by T0.
The intuitive judgment here is two-fold. (5) is false. More importantly
for my purposes, (3) and (5) are incompatible, at most one of them
can be true. Even more strikingly, we could turn (5) into a truth by
qualifying which springs the generalization applies to, as in (6).
(6) (Ceteris paribus), all springs with iron bobs in such-and-such
magnetic ﬁelds have a period determined by T0.
The pattern of incompatible cp-generalizations that can be saved by
appropriate qualiﬁcation is quite general, as (7) and (8) illustrate.
(7) a. (Ceteris paribus), all ravens are black. (true)
b. (Ceteris paribus), all ravens are white. (false)
c. (Ceteris paribus), all albino ravens are white. (true)
(8) a. (Ceteris paribus), if the price of a good falls, demand for
that good increases. (true)
b. (Ceteris paribus), if the price of a good falls, demand for
that good falls. (false)
c. (Ceteris paribus), if the price of a good falls and the price of
a substitute good falls even more, demand for that (initial)
good falls. (true)
I think that this observation is also what fundamentally makes Wood-
ward’s inﬂuential example about charged particles work. He considers
(9).
(9) (Ceteris paribus), all charged objects accelerate at 10m/s2.
And he goes on to say:
For every charged object, there is an additional condition
K (having to do with the application of an electromagnetic
ﬁeld of appropriate strength to the object) that in conjunc-
tion with the object’s being charged is nomically sufﬁcient
for its accelerating at 10m/s2. [...] for those charged ob-
jects that do not accelerate at 10m/s2, there is always an
explanation that appeals to some other factor K0 for why
this is so—K0 will presumably have to do with the fact
that the object in question has been subjected to an elec-
tromagnetic ﬁeld (or some other force) of the wrong mag-
nitude to produce this acceleration. In addition, since clas-
sical electromagnetism is a powerful, non ad hoc theory,
K0 will ﬁgure in the explanation of many other facts. [...]
Even more alarmingly, parallel reasoning can be used to
show that “All charged particles accelerate at n m/s2” is
a ceteris paribus law for all other values of n.13
I especially want to draw attention to the end of this quotation. It is the
fact that, as far as Pietroski and Rey’s account enables us to see, each
of the generalizations of the form (10) is true that is the real concern.
(10) (Ceteris paribus), all charged particles accelerate at nm/s2.
13. Woodward (2002, 310).
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Thus, what is really problematic about Pietroski and Rey’s account
is the fact that it does not furnish the resources to distinguish the
true from the false instances of this schema. They all satisfy the non-
triviality condition. This way of diagnosing the problem with the ac-
count has some signiﬁcant advantages over Woodward’s original pre-
sentation. Woodward wants to simply conclude that the sentences of
the form (10) cannot all be cp-laws. But this conclusion doesn’t allow
us to distinguish two potential sources of the difﬁculty. The problem
could either be that the generalization said to be a law (ceteris paribus
or otherwise) is false, or the problem could be that the generalization,
though true, fails to be a law. Given that both of these options are live,
it’s not clear where to lay the blame for the failure of any instance of
(10) to be a cp-law.
By contrast, if the problem is about the consistency of various state-
ments, we know where to lay the blame. The generalizations said to be
laws cannot all be true together, so the problem is quite independent
of any issues regarding the nomic operator.14 This way of diagnosing
the problem also casts a different light on a discussion by Pietroski and
Rey in a similar context. They consider the concern that on their view,
it looks as if any true singular causal claim entails a corresponding
cp-law.
Every singular causal claim of the form A caused B—e.g.,
Alice’s favorite event caused Betty’s most hated event—is
a candidate for an interferable cp-law, since the quantiﬁer
might range over all the conditions that prevent As from
bringing about Bs in all other cases. So far as anything we
14. An anonymous reader for this journal suggested that perhaps an intuition
about lawhood is behind this example, after all. On this diagnosis, what’s
troublesome about the set of instances of the schema (10) is the fact that,
if they were all laws, the system of laws would be too complex. However,
this alternative diagnosis cannot account for the fact that the generalization
becomes acceptable once the subject term is appropriately qualiﬁed, as in
the examples (7) and (8). If the problem were with the complexity of the
laws, we’d expect it not to vanish when we qualify the subject term.
have said, there might be a cp-law ‘cp(A)B)’ to the effect
that, cp, Alice’s favorites cause Betty’s hateds; it is just that
cetera have been paria only once in the history of the world,
and, moreover, are not easily made so. However, we are
not committed to regarding ‘cp(A)B)’ as a bona ﬁde law,
but only to claiming that, given that the singular claim
is true, the corresponding CP law cannot be criticized for
being vacuous.15
I take it that similarly, Pietroski and Rey would say that the problem
with Woodward’s schema (10) is that these claims, though acceptable
generalizations, fail to be laws, i.e., that it is the job of the nomic oper-
ator to explain why the instances of (10) are unacceptable as cp-laws.
But if I am right in saying that the problem is at bottom one about con-
sistency, not the nomic status of the generalizations, then this reply is
insufﬁcient. We’re missing something fundamental about the seman-
tics of the generalizations said to be laws by being unable to capture
obvious inconsistencies among them.16
The upshot of the discussion is therefore mixed. On the one hand,
we’ve seen that thinking about cp-generalizations in terms of causal
processes or mechanisms is very appealing, because it allows us to give
a convincing account of the open-endedness of cp-generalizations—
one of the features that needs to be explained. On the other hand,
we don’t have the right way of spelling out that connection, because
we cannot capture consistencies and inconsistencies. Incidentally, we
also lack an account of why cp-generalizations change their truth-value
in response to large-scale, but not small-scale changes in the way the
world is. In the case of Pietroski and Rey, the problem takes the form
of not being able to explain why even large-scale changes in the way
15. Pietroski and Rey (1995, 98-9).
16. Incidentally, in the linguistics literature, a very similar account to that of
Pietroski and Rey has been developed by Cavedon and Glasbey (1994),
drawing on work in Barwise (1993) and Barwise and Seligman (1994). Their
account suffers from identical drawbacks.
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the world is should falsify a cp-generalization. As I’ve argued, on their
view, cp-generalizations are in the ﬁrst instance claims about the exis-
tence of certain idealizations, and whether such idealizations exist is
completely independent of what the world is like.
We are thus left with the following explananda: why are cp-
generalizations open-ended? Why do they change their truth-value
only in response to large-scale changes in the way the world is? And:
how can we account for the semantic relations of consistency and in-
consistency among them? Answering the last question should also help
us see why we can save otherwise false cp-generalizations by appro-
priately modifying their subject terms, e.g., why ravens are white is false
but albino ravens are white is true.
3. Targeting the Analysis
I have so far gone along with the practice of speaking relatively indis-
criminately about cp-laws and cp-generalizations as if these formed a
uniﬁed class amenable to a uniﬁed treatment. However, I think that
Woodward is clearly right when he says that there is a
great diversity and heterogeneity [to] the generalizations
that philosophers propose to analyze in terms of the cate-
gory ceteris paribus laws.17
That means that any theory of generalizations in this area needs to
have a more sharply deﬁned range of phenomena as its subject matter.
A natural ﬁrst thought is that what is special about cp-generalizations
is the presence of a certain locution in their statement, to wit, ceteris
paribus. But as Schiffer and Woodward both point out, that phrase
is hardly ever employed outside of economics.18 We thus need some
other means of singling out the target phenomena and carve them up
into uniﬁed classes.
17. Woodward (2002, 305). Hall (2005) makes a similar observation.
18. See Schiffer (1991, 10) and Woodward (2002, 305).
3.1 CP-Generalizations and Generics
I suggest that we turn to natural language to do that job. Let me intro-
duce a class of linguistic phenomena that linguists and philosophers of
language study under the heading of generics. The term derives from
the intuition that very often, we speak about kinds—genera—and say
something about them. In some cases, we seem to speak of a kind as
a whole, as when we say that quartz is widespread or dodos are extinct.
However, some generics behave exactly like statements of cp-laws in
the sciences, such as ravens are black or turtles are long-lived. These sen-
tences are compatible with what would be counter-examples to the
corresponding universal generalizations, just as cp-generalizations are.
They also have what linguists often call a law-like ﬂavor, which is to
say that their semantics have modal import. We can bring this out by
observing that their truth is compatible with at least some situations
in which the corresponding existential generalization would be false.
Ravens are black, for example, is true even in a situation in which all
ravens have been painted.19 That means that the truth-value of such
a generic doesn’t just depend on the state of the world of evalua-
tion at the time of evaluation, but on what is true at other worlds
and/or times, i.e., on modal facts. They also exhibit the same open-
endedness and contrast between large- and small-scale changes as the
cp-generalizations paradigmatically discussed in the literature.
To a good ﬁrst approximation, I thus want to claim that such gener-
ics are used to state very many cp-laws. More speciﬁcally, if we con-
tinue to regiment the statement of cp-laws into the form it is a law that
(ceteris paribus) p, many cp-laws can be, and are indeed most naturally,
stated by removing the ceteris paribus locution along with any explicit
quantiﬁers and replacing the schematic variable p with a generic sen-
tence. (11) illustrates this connection by way of some examples.
19. Perhaps one would like to respond that, in the relevant sense, the ravens are
still black when they’re painted white, taking inspiration from Austin (1975)
and, following him, Travis (1985, 2000). However, the point still holds: lions
have four legs can be true even in a situation in which all lions have lost one
of their legs in accidents.
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(11) a. It is a law that (ceteris paribus), all slow rivers meander.
b. It is a law that (ceteris paribus), all grass is green.
c. It is a law that (ceteris paribus), if the price of a good falls,
demand always rises.
d. It is a law that (ceteris paribus), iron bars always expand
when heated.
Removing ceteris paribus and the explicit quantiﬁers leaves us with gen-
eralizations that have the same features.
(12) a. Slow rivers meander.
b. Grass is green.
c. If the price of a good falls, demand rises.
d. Iron bars expand when heated.
Just as importantly given the concerns I’ve raised in §2.3, we see the
same pattern of incompatibilities, as (13) and (14) illustrate.
(13) a. Ravens are black. (true)
b. Ravens are white. (false)
c. Albino ravens are white. (true)
(14) a. If the price of a good falls, demand for that good in-
creases. (true)
b. If the price of a good falls, demand for that good falls.
(false)
c. If the price of a good falls and the price of a substitute
good falls even more, demand for that (initial) good falls.
(true)
So if we want to understand cp-generalizations, we need to focus not
on the locution ceteris paribus, but on the rest of that statement.
3.2 Characterizing Sentences
The class of generics is very broad, and it is simply impossible to
do justice to that class as a whole. For that reason, I’ll focus my in-
quiry more narrowly on a class of sentences that I’ll call characteriz-
ing sentences.20 These are sentences that express a non-strict general-
ization over members of a kind and that have the modal component
I’ve pointed to.21 Because I’m restricting myself to generalizations over
members of a kind, I won’t discuss so-called habituals, such as the exam-
ples in (15).
(15) a. Mary smokes.
b. Dogs bark.
(15a), for example, says more than that Mary has, on at least one oc-
casion, smoked, but it also does not say that she smokes at all times.
Rather, we can get at what (15a) is after by interpreting it as a gen-
eralization over events that involve Mary, claiming that some appro-
priate subset of these events are ones in which Mary smokes.22 (15b)
mixes generalizations over objects and events and is therefore non-
strict twice over. It is both a characterizing sentence and a habitual: a
characterizing sentence because it does not apply to all dogs since it
doesn’t range over dogs without vocal tracts, and a habitual because
it does not say that all events involving the remaining dogs are bark-
ing events. I want to emphasize that my restriction to characterizing
sentences is therefore quite substantive, since it excludes ascriptions
of dispositions (ascriptions of properties such as being fragile), and it
excludes many statements involving explicit mention of the verb cause
because these ascriptions are usually couched in terms of habituals.
20. Here, I follow Krifka et al. (1995), which has done a lot to standardize the
terminology in the ﬁeld.
21. I thus set aside sentences that predicate a property of a kind as a whole,
such as quartz is widespread, and merely existential sentences such as ravens
are sitting on the wires outside my house.
22. This is an idea that traces back to Davidson’s discussion of action sentences
in Davidson (1980), and from there has become a central plank in what has
become known as neo-Davidsonian semantics, the view that all sentences,
not just action sentences, contain quantiﬁcation over events in their logical
form. One of the early applications of this idea to ascriptions of dispositions
is Lewis (1973a). For a more recent elaboration, see Fara (2001, 2005).
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The kind of proposition that is expressed by a sentence such as
ravens are black can be expressed in several different ways, aside from
the bare plural I just used. One could also use a singular deﬁnite or
singular indeﬁnite article, i.e., the or a, as in the raven is black and a raven
is black. Nonetheless, I’ll focus on sentences with bare plural subjects.23
In some cases, a sentence is ambiguous and can express two different
generic propositions, such as the famous typhoons arise in this part of the
Paciﬁc, which can be used to express either that this part of the Paciﬁc
is where typhoons arise—they only exceptionally arise elsewhere—or
that this part of the Paciﬁc is regularly subjected to typhoons, although
typhoons also arise elsewhere.24 The ﬁrst of these propositions is the
kind I’m after. Since none of the examples I’ll discuss exhibit this am-
biguity, I’ll ignore it from hereon.25
3.3 Semantics for Characterizing Sentences
The strategy now is to present enough of empirically motivated se-
mantics for characterizing sentences to allow me to account for the
puzzling features of cp-generalizations I’ve collected. The semantics
23. One reason for this preference is that plurality seems to be a basic ingre-
dient in genericity, and apparently singular subjects are nonetheless inter-
preted as having some features of plurality. We can see this by noting that
certain predicates that can usually only be applied to pluralities can appear
in generic sentences with singular subjects. For example, ordinarily we can
predicate form a circle or surround only of pluralities, as the contrast between
the children formed a circle and *Mary formed a circle shows. However, many
speakers ﬁnd the buffalo forms a protective circle completely acceptable.
24. The example is due to Milsark (1974).
25. Woodward suggests that sometimes, we can use such bare plural sentences
to express nothing more than statistical generalizations, citing such as ex-
amples as drivers in England drive on the left (Woodward, 2002, 311). Of-
ﬁcially, I can be agnostic on whether it’s possible to use bare plurals to
express such a pure regularity, saying only that bare plurals, when so used,
fall outside the purview of my theory. But as a matter of fact, I disagree
with Woodward’s characterization of the data. I think what’s really at issue
is whether this kind of generalization is, or can be, part of a systematic the-
ory and hence deserves the title of law, as Woodward seems to acknowledge
at (Woodward, 2002, 311).
I present will, at least initially, be formulated in terms of a primitive
notion of normality. I’ll then try to show that the special sciences nat-
urally provide the resources to relate that notion to the demands the-
ories in these disciplines face, especially demands that arise from the
complexity of the phenomena they investigate. In this way, my view
represents an alternative development of the guiding principle that
cp-generalizations reﬂect the needs of theorizing about complex phe-
nomena.26
Following a lot of work in this area, I will assume that the intu-
itive sense that characterizing sentences express generalizations over
the members of the kind mentioned is basically accurate. The question
is what kind of generalization that is.27 A ﬁrst pass at an answer is
this.
26. In providing truth-conditional semantics, I’ll take on commitments large
and small that I can only acknowledge here. First is the commitment that
giving truth-conditions is the right way to give the semantics of natural lan-
guage in general, or generics in particular. Opponents have cited generics in
arguing for alternative semantic frameworks. In the literature on linguistics
and philosophy of language, see Chomsky (1975), Leslie (2007, 2008), Schu-
bert and Pelletier (1989), and Veltman (1996). In the literature on philosophy
of science, some theorists have suggested that we shouldn’t interpret cp-law
statements as expressing propositions, but in some other way, perhaps as
inference rules, as in Lange (2000). For another alternative, see Glymour
(2002). One of the reasons theorists often give for rejecting ordinary truth-
conditional semantics is that while it’s possible to give somewhat plausible
semantics for simple cases, it is extremely hard to show how they can be
extended to more complex examples in a theoretically motivated and com-
positional way. This will be true of the semantics I present here, as well.
This is, in the ﬁrst place, a concern about the viability of a research pro-
gram, the program of ﬁtting semantics for characterizing sentences into the
overall truth-conditional framework. The right way to pursue this point is
to see whether the research program yields interesting results in some core
cases in order to determine whether it’s worthwhile to try to develop it
further.
27. For some reasons to prefer such a quantiﬁcational approach to the truth-
conditions of characterizing sentences, see Cohen (1999), Krifka et al. (1995).
I have also argued for it in Nickel (2008). One reason to adopt the quantiﬁ-
cational approach is that we can account for the availability of two readings
of typhoons arise in this part of the Paciﬁc.
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first pass truth-conditions
As are F is true iff all normal As are F.
The point of this ﬁrst step is to take into account the fact that char-
acterizing sentences tolerate exceptions: tolerable exceptions are not
normal, and hence do not falsify the characterizing sentence.28
We need to make these semantics slightly more sophisticated, a
move that can be motivated by considering the pair of sentences in
(16).
(16) a. Chickens lay eggs.
b. Chickens are hens.
If we interpreted (16a) as saying that all normal chickens lay eggs, and
(16b) as saying that all normal chickens are hens, then we would pre-
dict that (16a) entails (16b), since all chickens that lay eggs are hens.
However, that entailment clearly does not hold. The most plausible
way to block it is to say that when we interpret generics, we never
interpret them just by asking about what is normal per se. Rather, we
are always concerned with what is normal in this or that respect, and
the respect of normality is determined by the predicate in the generic.
28. One might worry about potential counter-examples at this stage.
(I) a. Dutchmen are good sailors.
b. Mosquitos carry plasmodia (the organisms that cause malaria in
humans).
(Ia) is not well paraphrased as saying that all normal Dutchmen are good
sailors, and (Ib) doesn’t seem to be as strong as the claim that all normal
mosquitos carry plasmodia. After all, (Ib) is true in the actual world, even
though only a minority of mosquitos actually carries the organisms, and that
minority doesn’t seem particularly normal. Sufﬁce it to say that there are re-
sponses available. Cohen (1999) and Krifka et al. (1995) suggest that (Ia) in-
volves a different reading of the bare plural. And the acceptability of (Ib) may
well be due to the fact that the sentence is ambiguous. The acceptable reading
might be the one that is a characterizing sentence about plasmodia, to the ef-
fect that all normal plasmodia are carried by mosquitos (as part of their normal
life-cycle). This isn’t the end of the debate, obviously.
On this strategy, (16a) says not that all normal chickens lay eggs, but
rather, that all chickens that are normal with respect to how they ex-
trude offspring lay eggs. By contrast, (16b) says that all chickens that
are normal with respect to their sex are hens. These paraphrases are
such that we no longer predict (16a) to entail (16b). In fact, we predict
the intuitively correct truth-values, since on this paraphrase, the latter
is false.
We need to complicate the semantics still further to account for the
examples in (17) and (18).
(17) a. Bears live in North America.
b. Bears live in South America.
c. Bears live in Europe.
d. Bears live in Asia.
(18) a. Elephants live in Africa.
b. Elephants live in Asia.
In these cases, the respect of normality is the same—normal in respect
of habitat. Applying the current semantics would predict that each
bear that is normal in this respect lives on four continents, which the
examples in (17) obviously do not entail. The best way to deal with
examples like this is to introduce ways of being normal and allow the
truth-conditions to explicitly quantify over them. Thus, the examples
in (17) might be paraphrased by the corresponding ones in (19).29
(19) a. There is a way w of being a bear that is normal with re-
spect to its habitat, and all bears that are normal in way w
live in North America.
b. There is a way w of being a bear that is normal with re-
spect to its habitat, and all bears that are normal in way w
live in South America.
29. I’ve argued in detail that introducing such ways of being normal and quan-
tifying over them brings signiﬁcant empirical beneﬁts. See my (2008).
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might be the one that is a characterizing sentence about plasmodia, to the ef-
fect that all normal plasmodia are carried by mosquitos (as part of their normal
life-cycle). This isn’t the end of the debate, obviously.
On this strategy, (16a) says not that all normal chickens lay eggs, but
rather, that all chickens that are normal with respect to how they ex-
trude offspring lay eggs. By contrast, (16b) says that all chickens that
are normal with respect to their sex are hens. These paraphrases are
such that we no longer predict (16a) to entail (16b). In fact, we predict
the intuitively correct truth-values, since on this paraphrase, the latter
is false.
We need to complicate the semantics still further to account for the
examples in (17) and (18).
(17) a. Bears live in North America.
b. Bears live in South America.
c. Bears live in Europe.
d. Bears live in Asia.
(18) a. Elephants live in Africa.
b. Elephants live in Asia.
In these cases, the respect of normality is the same—normal in respect
of habitat. Applying the current semantics would predict that each
bear that is normal in this respect lives on four continents, which the
examples in (17) obviously do not entail. The best way to deal with
examples like this is to introduce ways of being normal and allow the
truth-conditions to explicitly quantify over them. Thus, the examples
in (17) might be paraphrased by the corresponding ones in (19).29
(19) a. There is a way w of being a bear that is normal with re-
spect to its habitat, and all bears that are normal in way w
live in North America.
b. There is a way w of being a bear that is normal with re-
spect to its habitat, and all bears that are normal in way w
live in South America.
29. I’ve argued in detail that introducing such ways of being normal and quan-
tifying over them brings signiﬁcant empirical beneﬁts. See my (2008).
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c. There is a way w of being a bear that is normal with re-
spect to its habitat, and all bears that are normal in way w
live in Europe.
d. There is a way w of being a bear that is normal with re-
spect to its habitat, and all bears that are normal in way w
live in Asia.
As these paraphrases make clear, there is no reason to think that any of
the examples in (19) can be put together with any of the others to de-
rive unwanted conclusions about the habitats of individual bears, since
being a bear that’s normal in one of the ways does not entail anything
one way or another in regards to being a bear that’s normal in some
other way. More generally, then, the truth-conditions for characterizing
sentences that I want to work with are these.30
semantics for characterizing sentences
As are F is true iff there is a way w of being an F-normal A such
that all As that are normal in way w are F.
Here, F-normal is short for normal in a respect determined by the predicate
F. And I want to emphasize that the property I pick out by normal is
not necessarily the property picked out by the ordinary English word
normal, it is a placeholder for a property to be elucidated in the next
section. That means, in particular, that I do not predict ravens are normal
ravens to be a truth, let alone a necessary one.
30. Incidentally, here the locution ceteris paribus seems to make a genuine se-
mantic contribution to sentences in which it appears. When one prefaces a
characterizing sentence with ceteris paribus, that sentence is true only if it
mentions all of the ways of being normal in the respect at issue in interpret-
ing that sentence. Thus, (IIa) is true while (IIb) is false.
(II) a. Ceteris paribus, elephants live in Africa and Asia.
b. Ceteris paribus, elephants live in Africa.
But aside from this quirk, ceteris paribus does not seem to have any semantic
impact on the interpretation of characterizing sentences.
These semantics do not yet incorporate the modal element that ac-
counts for the law-like ﬂavor of characterizing sentences. We can add it
simply by introducing a counterfactual element to the truth-conditions,
as illustrated for a particular example in (20).
(20) a. Ravens are black.
b. There is a way of being a normally colored raven such
that, if there was a raven that was colored in that way,
then all ravens that would be colored in that way would
be black.
In those cases in which there is a relevantly normal raven, the truth-
conditions (20b) just collapse into the semantics I’ve highlighted, so I’ll
ignore this counterfactual element.
As the statement of the semantics make clear, the only so far un-
explained primitive notion is that of normality. More speciﬁcally, we
need to complete the biconditional in (21).
(21) x is an A that is an F-normal A in some way w iff ...
The task of the next section is to develop the resources to do just that.
4. Complex Phenomena: Causal Homogeneity and Uniﬁcation
Different scientiﬁc disciplines appeal to different properties in order
to formulate their respective theories. Given that these different disci-
plines investigate different phenomena, this is unsurprising. Different
categorizing schemes will serve different investigative aims better or
worse. The question I want to address is this: what makes a scheme
of classiﬁcation the (or a) right one for a given discipline? This is one
question we can ask by asking what the natural kinds for a given range
of phenomena are.
That question is distinct from various other metaphysical and lin-
guistic issues that arise in the context of natural kinds and natural
kind terms. I am not, at least in the ﬁrst instance, concerned with
the question whether there are any objective divisions among phe-
nomena, where groupings that correspond to such objective divisions
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form a natural kind while gerrymandered groupings do not. Nor am I
concerned with the question whether, assuming that there are natural
kinds, the naturalness of natural kinds is a basic feature of the world,
or whether that naturalness can be reduced to something else.31 I will
not ask about the connection between natural kinds and essential prop-
erties, either, for example, whether it is true that if an object belongs
to a natural kind, that is an essential property of that object. Finally,
I will not address the semantics of natural kind terms. I will remain
silent, for example, on whether descriptivism is true as a metasemantic
theory of such terms, and on whether natural kind terms retain a con-
stant meaning or a constant reference across even substantial changes
in theory.32 These are all important questions, but my discussion can
hopefully proceed while remaining neutral on all of them. I need to
register only one caveat: I will appeal to causation in making theoreti-
cal claims. To the extent that such appeals carry commitments on the
issues I just mentioned, I won’t remain neutral on them. However, the
notion of causation seems sufﬁciently basic to think that any theory of
science has to be compatible with broad appeals to it.
The question then is this: what are some of the desiderata that a
property should meet if it is to be useful for couching theories of a par-
ticular domain? In broad outline, the answer to that question is clear.
Practitioners of a discipline want to appeal to those properties that al-
low them to formulate systematic and powerful theories.33 The more
31. For citations about these issues, see the updated bibliography in Bird and
Tobin (Winter 2008).
32. That is, I’ll be silent on whether Kripke (1972) and Putnam (1975a,b) are
right about natural kind terms.
33. Many theorists who endorse this general principle in fact hold a more spe-
ciﬁc version, one that is particularly keyed to explanatory power. Thus, for
example, Kitcher: “Natural kinds are the sets that one picks out in giving
explanations. They are the sets corresponding to predicates that ﬁgure in
our explanatory scheme.” (Kitcher, 1984, 315n11) Similar remarks can be
found in Platts (1983, 134), LaPorte (2004, 19), Rieppel and Kearney (2007,
97), and Root (2000, S629). Wilson (1996, 307), a review of Dupré (1993),
makes the point that the issue of pluralism about species turns on whether
there are different disciplines that are equally legitimate but require differ-
ent classiﬁcatory schemes in order to achieve their aims, thus endorsing my
speciﬁc claim I want to make here is that there are at least two such
desiderata, which I’ll call causal homogeneity and unifying power. I’ll
then argue that, in any science that investigates complex phenomena,
these two demands are in tension, and the resolution of the tension
furnishes us with the resources to explicate the notion of normality I
appealed to in my semantics.34
To impose some order, I’ll assume that each discipline, at least at
a given time, has a range of phenomena it seeks to investigate and
theorize about. Geography, for example, investigates the shape of the
Earth’s surface, the distribution and shape of rivers, and so on. Evo-
lutionary biology investigates the myriad ways in which organisms ﬁt
into their environment and how the species to which these organisms
belong evolve. I’ll call these the discipline’s target phenomena. At least
one important aim of theorizing is to formulate generalizations about
the shape these target phenomena actually take, for instance, general-
izations about what shape rivers are, and what colors various species
are. The general structure is well captured in terms of determinable
and determinate relations. We can think of target phenomena in terms
of properties such as the property of having some shape or other and
the property of having some coloration or other, and we can think
about the generalizations as telling us which determinate of that de-
terminable is actually instantiated, such as which shape rivers actually
have, and which color scheme members of a kind actually have.
claim, as well. Boyd (1991, 1999a,b) and philosophers following him, such
as Kornblith (1993) even go so far as to suggest that a theory of natural
kinds just is a theory that addresses the question I’m asking.
34. In this discussion, I do not want to presuppose that any scheme currently
employed actually meets these desiderata. Indeed, changes in such catego-
rizing schemes are the results of investigation as much as anything else,
and thus represent genuine progress. But that doesn’t mean that we cannot
ask about the desiderata that practitioners try to meet more and more suc-
cessfully as they adapt their categorizing schemes to the phenomena they
study.
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4.1 Causal Homogeneity
My ﬁrst constraint grows out of the informal suggestion that gener-
alizations in scientiﬁc disciplines should map out the causal structure
of the domain under investigation. There are several reasons theorists
have given for endorsing this claim. One is broadly epistemological.
On this strategy, we appeal to causation to explain what makes a hy-
pothesis projectible. Roughly, the reason that all emeralds are green is
projectible while all emeralds are grue is not is that the former reﬂects
the causal structure of the world in a sense to be made more precise.35
A second strategy begins with broadly explanatory considerations. If
the generalizations of a discipline are to play a role in causal expla-
nation, they have to correspond to the causal structure of the world.36
The third strategy focuses on practical considerations. If we want gen-
eralizations to guide our interventions in the phenomena the sciences
investigate, these generalizations need to furnish causal information
about the world.37
The informal notion of a generalization’s corresponding to or map-
ping the causal structure of the world needs to be made more precise
in order to be useful in theorizing. I suggest that we do so by requiring
that generalizations in the sciences be causally sustained. A general-
ization of the form all As are Bs is causally sustained iff all As are B and
in all of the cases in which the properties of being an A and being a B
are coinstantiated, that coinstantiation is the result of the same causal
mechanism. In this sense, the generalization all gold melts at 1948F is
causally sustained.
What makes the notion of a causally sustained generalization a
good candidate for explicating what it means for a generalization to
correspond to or map the causal structure of the world is the require-
ment that the mechanism that accounts for the coinstantiation of the
35. See, e.g., the papers by Boyd and Kornblith cited in note 33, as well as
Millikan (1999).
36. See, e.g., Salmon (1984, 1989) and Strevens (2004).
37. See, e.g., Woodward (2003).
two properties be the same in all of the cases in which that coinstan-
tiation occurs. That is what crucially distinguishes causally sustained
from merely accidental generalizations. In the accidental ones, it is true
that for every case in which the properties are coinstantiated, there is
a causal mechanism that accounts for it, but it is not the same in all
cases.
At this point, one might have two concerns about the thesis that all
generalizations in the sciences should be causally sustained. First, one
might worry that the notion of a single causal mechanism isn’t well-
deﬁned, because we can individuate causal mechanisms any way we
want. For that reason, any given case in which an A is a B instantiates
indeﬁnitely many mechanisms if it instantiates any, and depending on
which of these mechanisms is at issue, a generalization either will or
will not count as causally sustained.
The concern is reasonable as far as it goes, and it would be de-
bilitating if there were no further constraints on how we should in-
dividuate processes. I want to contend, however, that there are such
further constraints, because whether a generalization is causally sus-
tained should be evaluated within the context of a particular discipline.
This is important because distinct disciplines have proprietary ways of
individuating mechanisms. We can see this quite clearly in discussions
of supervenience. It is commonplace to describe one manifestation of
multiple realizability by saying that one and the same mental process
can be realized by several, very different neural, biological, or chem-
ical processes. That description presupposes that these different dis-
ciplines have their own ways of individuating types of mechanisms.
This response to the concern has the consequence that a generaliza-
tion may count as causally sustained by the lights of one discipline
but not by the lights of another. I take this to be a favorable result,
since it seems to harmonize with one prominent way of understanding
what the autonomy of higher-level disciplines amounts to: being able
to recognize commonalities among phenomena invisible to lower-level
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can be realized by several, very different neural, biological, or chem-
ical processes. That description presupposes that these different dis-
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This response to the concern has the consequence that a generaliza-
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disciplines.38
Even granting that the notion of a single causal mechanism is well-
deﬁned within the context of a discipline, one might worry that the
requirement that there be a single mechanism is too strong. Perhaps it
is enough that there be a small number of processes that jointly sus-
tain a generalization. However, even when the discipline in the context
of which a cp-generalization is articulated recognizes a multiplicity of
processes, it usually also recognizes these multiple processes as be-
longing to a higher type. Let me brieﬂy discuss an evolutionary exam-
ple.39 Populations of E. coli bacteria evolve very rapidly. Subjected to
an environment that is low on a particular nutrient, such as glucose,
such populations evolve to become more efﬁcient at using the reduced
nutrients. They can accomplish this by various different genetic paths,
a fact that shows up once the evolved populations are subjected to
other nutrient-deprived environments. Some of the populations that
are good at using glucose are not very efﬁcient at using fructose, while
others are. The structure of the example is thus that at one level of
description, there are several causal mechanisms that underwrite the
efﬁciency of e. coli at utilizing glucose. At another level of description,
there is just one. And quite plausibly, the context in which we want to
formulate generalizations about the adaptability of e. coli to nutrient-
deprived environments are ones in which the particular genetic basis
of the change doesn’t matter.
Given that we want generalizations to be causally sustained, we can
also draw a conclusion about a desideratum for the properties we men-
tion in these generalizations. If a generalization of the form all As are
38. This response goes only part of the way towards a resolution of the
worry since it is a substantive question how to individuate disciplines.
For one, simply identifying disciplines as ﬁnely (or coarsely) as univer-
sity departments—biology, chemistry, etc.—is too coarse. A discipline is
rather marked out by the coherence between the target phenomena, re-
search strategies, and evidential and explanatory standards. My account
trades on the existence of disciplines thus picked out.
39. This example is discussed at length in Travisano et al. (1995).
Bs is to be causally sustained, then the predicate A in such a general-
ization needs to have in its extension only objects that are involved in
the same causal mechanism with regards to whether they are in the
extension of B or not. When that is the case, we can say that the As are
causally homogeneous with respect to whether they are B or not. More
explicitly:
causal homogeneity The property of being an A is causally homoge-
neous with respect to whether all As are B iff all As are involved
in the same causal mechanism in determining whether they are
B.
For example, the property of being gold is causally homogeneous with
respect to the generalization all gold melts at 1948F.
Thus, we have good theoretical grounds for saying that a property
is a natural kind for a discipline only if that property is causally ho-
mogeneous with respect to the universal generalizations that discipline
seeks to articulate. The example of natural kinds in the fundamental
sciences certainly satisfy this condition.40 However, this condition ﬁts
awkwardly with the special sciences, and indeed it is awkward twice
over. In the ﬁrst instance, the special sciences do not seek to articulate
straightforward universal generalizations, though I’ve suggested that
in fact, the cp-generalizations they do articulate are restricted univer-
sal ones. More importantly, it does not seem as if it is a goal to formu-
late predicates that denote causally homogeneous classes, though that
would clearly be possible. For example, if we focus not simply on all
of the ravens, but on ones that go through a particular developmental
process D, we would have a property that is causally homogeneous
with respect to all ravens that go through D are black. But we do not
see a predicate that picks out such a homogeneous class. In this re-
spect, the situation is precisely the reverse of the one encountered in
the fundamental sciences. There, practitioners adjust the extension of
40. The condition is also in line with Putnam’s suggestion that natural kinds
are explanatory kinds; see Putnam (1975a).
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disciplines.38
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processes, it usually also recognizes these multiple processes as be-
longing to a higher type. Let me brieﬂy discuss an evolutionary exam-
ple.39 Populations of E. coli bacteria evolve very rapidly. Subjected to
an environment that is low on a particular nutrient, such as glucose,
such populations evolve to become more efﬁcient at using the reduced
nutrients. They can accomplish this by various different genetic paths,
a fact that shows up once the evolved populations are subjected to
other nutrient-deprived environments. Some of the populations that
are good at using glucose are not very efﬁcient at using fructose, while
others are. The structure of the example is thus that at one level of
description, there are several causal mechanisms that underwrite the
efﬁciency of e. coli at utilizing glucose. At another level of description,
there is just one. And quite plausibly, the context in which we want to
formulate generalizations about the adaptability of e. coli to nutrient-
deprived environments are ones in which the particular genetic basis
of the change doesn’t matter.
Given that we want generalizations to be causally sustained, we can
also draw a conclusion about a desideratum for the properties we men-
tion in these generalizations. If a generalization of the form all As are
38. This response goes only part of the way towards a resolution of the
worry since it is a substantive question how to individuate disciplines.
For one, simply identifying disciplines as ﬁnely (or coarsely) as univer-
sity departments—biology, chemistry, etc.—is too coarse. A discipline is
rather marked out by the coherence between the target phenomena, re-
search strategies, and evidential and explanatory standards. My account
trades on the existence of disciplines thus picked out.
39. This example is discussed at length in Travisano et al. (1995).
Bs is to be causally sustained, then the predicate A in such a general-
ization needs to have in its extension only objects that are involved in
the same causal mechanism with regards to whether they are in the
extension of B or not. When that is the case, we can say that the As are
causally homogeneous with respect to whether they are B or not. More
explicitly:
causal homogeneity The property of being an A is causally homoge-
neous with respect to whether all As are B iff all As are involved
in the same causal mechanism in determining whether they are
B.
For example, the property of being gold is causally homogeneous with
respect to the generalization all gold melts at 1948F.
Thus, we have good theoretical grounds for saying that a property
is a natural kind for a discipline only if that property is causally ho-
mogeneous with respect to the universal generalizations that discipline
seeks to articulate. The example of natural kinds in the fundamental
sciences certainly satisfy this condition.40 However, this condition ﬁts
awkwardly with the special sciences, and indeed it is awkward twice
over. In the ﬁrst instance, the special sciences do not seek to articulate
straightforward universal generalizations, though I’ve suggested that
in fact, the cp-generalizations they do articulate are restricted univer-
sal ones. More importantly, it does not seem as if it is a goal to formu-
late predicates that denote causally homogeneous classes, though that
would clearly be possible. For example, if we focus not simply on all
of the ravens, but on ones that go through a particular developmental
process D, we would have a property that is causally homogeneous
with respect to all ravens that go through D are black. But we do not
see a predicate that picks out such a homogeneous class. In this re-
spect, the situation is precisely the reverse of the one encountered in
the fundamental sciences. There, practitioners adjust the extension of
40. The condition is also in line with Putnam’s suggestion that natural kinds
are explanatory kinds; see Putnam (1975a).
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their predicates so that they can use them to formulate straightforward,
causally sustained generalizations. In the case of the special sciences,
practitioners retain the predicates and give up on the straightforward
universal generalizations.
This pattern isn’t restricted to biology by any stretch of the imagina-
tion. We see the same thing in geography. Consider being a river. The
true generalizations about all rivers whatsoever seem to mostly mark
constitutive connections, such as carrying water. In order to reach a
causally homogeneous property, we need to focus on a more narrowly
deﬁned one. Being a river that runs through such-and-such soil and
subject to such-and-such ﬂuctuations in water level might be causally
homogeneous with respect to all such rivers meander, but again, we do
not see simple predicates that denote such a causally homogeneous
property. To understand what’s going on, I want to introduce the next
desideratum for a natural kind property.
4.2 Unifying Power
One of the aspects of a theory that makes it systematic is its unifying
power. Intuitively, a theory has more unifying power if it contains gen-
eralizations that connect many targets of inquiry. The crucial question
is how to spell out the metaphor of connecting different phenomena
via a collection of generalizations. One way to do so is to ﬁnd a num-
ber of true universal generalizations that all agree on their scope but
differ in their predicates. Newtonian mechanics paradigmatically ex-
hibits this kind of connection. Bodies with a certain mass have many
properties in common. Moreover, the demand that the natural kinds
of that discipline be causally homogeneous harmonizes well with this
way of cashing out the demand for uniﬁcation. Its practitioners can
attempt—and are at times successful—at satisfying both of these de-
mands.
However, in the case of the special sciences, these two demands are
fundamentally in tension. Suppose that we ﬁx on a class of ravens R1
that is causally homogeneous with respect to all ravens in R1 are black.
R1 will in turn not be causally homogeneous with respect to any other
generalization. Not only is all ravens in R1 have two wings not causally
sustained, it’s false. This is a non-accidental feature of the phenomenon
under investigation, speciﬁcally of the mechanisms that could causally
sustain a generalization. Most of these mechanisms can operate inde-
pendently of each other. To see this point in an example, suppose that
in addition to R1 we focus on a class of ravens R2 that is causally ho-
mogeneous with respect to all ravens in R2 have two wings. The two
classes R1 and R2 don’t coincide, since there are winged albinos and
black ravens that have lost a wing.
Let me now argue that this tension cannot be analyzed away in or-
der to motivate my preferred resolution, introducing a different way
of cashing out the metaphor of connecting phenomena. One might try
to say that we can make the property denoted by the predicate raven
causally homogeneous with respect to many different generalizations
by intersecting all of the classes that are causally homogeneous with
respect to at least one such generalization. For example, we might sim-
ply intersect R1 and R2, yielding a class that is causally homogeneous
with respect to both generalizations. One should then perform this op-
eration for all targets of inquiry that we can formulate an acceptable
generalization about.
There’s something intuitively odd about this approach, since it
would exclude many ravens from the extension of the predicate raven,
but the intuitive oddity can be countered by thinking of raven as pick-
ing out the typical or paradigmatic ravens. We can object to the ap-
proach more sharply by pointing out that it is subject to a dilemma.
Either we intersect all homogeneous subclasses, or we do not. If we
do, we will at least sometimes end up with an empty extension. That’s
because we sometimes ﬁnd sets of characterizing sentences that are all
true but predicate incompatible properties, such as (22).
(22) a. Lions have manes.
b. Lions give birth to live young.
The class of lions that are causally homogeneous with respect to their
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their predicates so that they can use them to formulate straightforward,
causally sustained generalizations. In the case of the special sciences,
practitioners retain the predicates and give up on the straightforward
universal generalizations.
This pattern isn’t restricted to biology by any stretch of the imagina-
tion. We see the same thing in geography. Consider being a river. The
true generalizations about all rivers whatsoever seem to mostly mark
constitutive connections, such as carrying water. In order to reach a
causally homogeneous property, we need to focus on a more narrowly
deﬁned one. Being a river that runs through such-and-such soil and
subject to such-and-such ﬂuctuations in water level might be causally
homogeneous with respect to all such rivers meander, but again, we do
not see simple predicates that denote such a causally homogeneous
property. To understand what’s going on, I want to introduce the next
desideratum for a natural kind property.
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power. Intuitively, a theory has more unifying power if it contains gen-
eralizations that connect many targets of inquiry. The crucial question
is how to spell out the metaphor of connecting different phenomena
via a collection of generalizations. One way to do so is to ﬁnd a num-
ber of true universal generalizations that all agree on their scope but
differ in their predicates. Newtonian mechanics paradigmatically ex-
hibits this kind of connection. Bodies with a certain mass have many
properties in common. Moreover, the demand that the natural kinds
of that discipline be causally homogeneous harmonizes well with this
way of cashing out the demand for uniﬁcation. Its practitioners can
attempt—and are at times successful—at satisfying both of these de-
mands.
However, in the case of the special sciences, these two demands are
fundamentally in tension. Suppose that we ﬁx on a class of ravens R1
that is causally homogeneous with respect to all ravens in R1 are black.
R1 will in turn not be causally homogeneous with respect to any other
generalization. Not only is all ravens in R1 have two wings not causally
sustained, it’s false. This is a non-accidental feature of the phenomenon
under investigation, speciﬁcally of the mechanisms that could causally
sustain a generalization. Most of these mechanisms can operate inde-
pendently of each other. To see this point in an example, suppose that
in addition to R1 we focus on a class of ravens R2 that is causally ho-
mogeneous with respect to all ravens in R2 have two wings. The two
classes R1 and R2 don’t coincide, since there are winged albinos and
black ravens that have lost a wing.
Let me now argue that this tension cannot be analyzed away in or-
der to motivate my preferred resolution, introducing a different way
of cashing out the metaphor of connecting phenomena. One might try
to say that we can make the property denoted by the predicate raven
causally homogeneous with respect to many different generalizations
by intersecting all of the classes that are causally homogeneous with
respect to at least one such generalization. For example, we might sim-
ply intersect R1 and R2, yielding a class that is causally homogeneous
with respect to both generalizations. One should then perform this op-
eration for all targets of inquiry that we can formulate an acceptable
generalization about.
There’s something intuitively odd about this approach, since it
would exclude many ravens from the extension of the predicate raven,
but the intuitive oddity can be countered by thinking of raven as pick-
ing out the typical or paradigmatic ravens. We can object to the ap-
proach more sharply by pointing out that it is subject to a dilemma.
Either we intersect all homogeneous subclasses, or we do not. If we
do, we will at least sometimes end up with an empty extension. That’s
because we sometimes ﬁnd sets of characterizing sentences that are all
true but predicate incompatible properties, such as (22).
(22) a. Lions have manes.
b. Lions give birth to live young.
The class of lions that are causally homogeneous with respect to their
philosophers’ imprint - 17 - vol. 10, no. 6 (july 2010)bernhard nickel Ceteris Paribus Laws: Generics and Natural Kinds
sexually selected head-dress and that can causally sustain (22a) ex-
cludes females; the corresponding class for (22b) includes only females.
Hence, the intersection of these two classes is empty. On the other horn
of the dilemma, we intersect only some causally homogeneous sub-
classes. In that case, we’ve added a bit of unifying power, since the
relevant properties are causally homogeneous with respect to more
generalizations, but it is still puzzling why there should be a single
predicate that denotes different properties in different generalizations.
We therefore cannot analyze away the tension between the demands of
causal homogeneity and unifying power by manipulating the interpre-
tation of the kind terms involved. Instead, we should reconceive what
unifying power comes to in the special sciences.
The key innovation is two-fold, changing both the relata and the
posited relation between them. Rather than focus on the kind terms
that appear in the different generalizations (or the properties denoted
by them), we should focus on the mechanisms that causally sustain
them. And rather than require that the relation be one of identity, we
should only require that the relation be theoretically important, given
the demands of the discipline. Thus, a set of generalizations is uniﬁed
if the mechanisms that causally sustain them are related in a theoreti-
cally important way.
One may worry, of course, that an appeal to a “theoretically im-
portant relation” among mechanisms deprives the account of any con-
tent it might otherwise have had. The apparent contentlessness of the
notion is a result of the fact that I am trying to capture what is com-
mon to many disciplines, each of which determines what the theoreti-
cally important relations are empirically. Within a given discipline, the
notion of a theoretically important relation among mechanisms has
much richer content. In broadly evolutionary contexts, for example,
the theoretically important relations are all either directly or indirectly
the result of selection. For example, the presence of a developmental
mechanism in the population of ravens that yields black ravens and
the presence of one that yields two-legged ones are both the result
of selection. In micro-economics, the mechanisms that are eligible to
underwrite a cp-generalization are all related to each other insofar as
they all reﬂect the deliberation of an economically rational agent under
budget constraints. In physical systems such as pendula, springs, and
gases, the mechanisms are related by incorporating the minimal set of
causal factors that are responsible for the distinctive behavior of these
kinds of things, such as harmonic motion or an equilibrium between
various properties.
This account doesn’t yet explain why we see predicates like raven in
the generalizations of the special sciences. To see that, I need to return
to the semantics of characterizing sentences.
4.3 Normality
Our task is to complete the biconditional (21).
(21) x is an A that is an F-normal A in some way w iff ...
For now, I’ll focus on the cases in which A is replaced by a simple
noun, such as raven. I’ll have more to say about how to explicate nor-
mality when it comes to modiﬁed nouns, such as albino raven, below.
With this restriction in mind, I’ll divide that task into three questions.
Why should there be a restriction to a subset of As at all—why restrict
ourselves to normal members of the kind in the ﬁrst place? Why, given
that there is such a restriction in the ﬁrst place, does that restriction
depend on the predicate—why do we need normality in a respect? And
why are there sometimes several ways of being normal in that respect?
We need to restrict ourselves to a particular subset of the As in
formulating a generalization about As because such a generalization
should be causally sustained, and hence the class of objects the gener-
alization is about should be causally homogeneous with respect to that
generalization. As we saw in the previous section, for most choices of
A and most generalizations, the whole class of As won’t be relevantly
causally homogeneous. Hence, we need to have a notion of normality.
We’ve also seen that due to the nature of the mechanisms that can
causally sustain generalizations, these mechanisms can usually oper-
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sexually selected head-dress and that can causally sustain (22a) ex-
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Hence, the intersection of these two classes is empty. On the other horn
of the dilemma, we intersect only some causally homogeneous sub-
classes. In that case, we’ve added a bit of unifying power, since the
relevant properties are causally homogeneous with respect to more
generalizations, but it is still puzzling why there should be a single
predicate that denotes different properties in different generalizations.
We therefore cannot analyze away the tension between the demands of
causal homogeneity and unifying power by manipulating the interpre-
tation of the kind terms involved. Instead, we should reconceive what
unifying power comes to in the special sciences.
The key innovation is two-fold, changing both the relata and the
posited relation between them. Rather than focus on the kind terms
that appear in the different generalizations (or the properties denoted
by them), we should focus on the mechanisms that causally sustain
them. And rather than require that the relation be one of identity, we
should only require that the relation be theoretically important, given
the demands of the discipline. Thus, a set of generalizations is uniﬁed
if the mechanisms that causally sustain them are related in a theoreti-
cally important way.
One may worry, of course, that an appeal to a “theoretically im-
portant relation” among mechanisms deprives the account of any con-
tent it might otherwise have had. The apparent contentlessness of the
notion is a result of the fact that I am trying to capture what is com-
mon to many disciplines, each of which determines what the theoreti-
cally important relations are empirically. Within a given discipline, the
notion of a theoretically important relation among mechanisms has
much richer content. In broadly evolutionary contexts, for example,
the theoretically important relations are all either directly or indirectly
the result of selection. For example, the presence of a developmental
mechanism in the population of ravens that yields black ravens and
the presence of one that yields two-legged ones are both the result
of selection. In micro-economics, the mechanisms that are eligible to
underwrite a cp-generalization are all related to each other insofar as
they all reﬂect the deliberation of an economically rational agent under
budget constraints. In physical systems such as pendula, springs, and
gases, the mechanisms are related by incorporating the minimal set of
causal factors that are responsible for the distinctive behavior of these
kinds of things, such as harmonic motion or an equilibrium between
various properties.
This account doesn’t yet explain why we see predicates like raven in
the generalizations of the special sciences. To see that, I need to return
to the semantics of characterizing sentences.
4.3 Normality
Our task is to complete the biconditional (21).
(21) x is an A that is an F-normal A in some way w iff ...
For now, I’ll focus on the cases in which A is replaced by a simple
noun, such as raven. I’ll have more to say about how to explicate nor-
mality when it comes to modiﬁed nouns, such as albino raven, below.
With this restriction in mind, I’ll divide that task into three questions.
Why should there be a restriction to a subset of As at all—why restrict
ourselves to normal members of the kind in the ﬁrst place? Why, given
that there is such a restriction in the ﬁrst place, does that restriction
depend on the predicate—why do we need normality in a respect? And
why are there sometimes several ways of being normal in that respect?
We need to restrict ourselves to a particular subset of the As in
formulating a generalization about As because such a generalization
should be causally sustained, and hence the class of objects the gener-
alization is about should be causally homogeneous with respect to that
generalization. As we saw in the previous section, for most choices of
A and most generalizations, the whole class of As won’t be relevantly
causally homogeneous. Hence, we need to have a notion of normality.
We’ve also seen that due to the nature of the mechanisms that can
causally sustain generalizations, these mechanisms can usually oper-
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ate independently of each other. That is to say, the subsets of As that
are homogeneous with respect to two different generalizations usually
do not coincide. That in turn means that the subset needs to depend
on the generalization we are considering. That is just to say that what
counts as relevantly normal needs to depend on the predicate, which
is why what is at issue is not just being a normal A, but being one that
is normal in a respect determined by the predicate. Here, the notion of
a target of inquiry is extremely useful: the respect determined by the
predicate just is the target of inquiry of which that predicate denotes a
determinate. For example, if the predicate is black, then the target of in-
quiry is coloration, and that is just the respect of normality determined
by the predicate.
Finally, we can also account for the fact that at times, there are mul-
tiple ways of being normal, even once we ﬁx on a particular respect.
Suppose that we’re thinking about a particular target of inquiry T, such
as habitat. What makes an A normal with respect to T is the fact that
it goes through a causal mechanism that determines which determi-
nate of T this A has, together with the fact that this causal mechanism
bears a theoretically important relation to other mechanisms for other
targets. In the case of habitat, that may be that the presence of the
mechanism is the result of an adaptation. But there may be several
mechanisms that determine a value for T and that all bear the same
relation, e.g., that are all adaptations. And that just means that there
are multiple ways of being normal in the respect of T.
Let me summarize by completing the biconditional.
normality Assume that we are considering the characterizing sen-
tence As are F with target of inquiry TF. Then:
x is an A that is an F-normal A in some way w iff
(i) x is an A, and
(ii) x is involved in a mechanism m that determines that x has
one of the determinates of TF, and
(iii) m stands in a theoretically important relation to mecha-
nisms that determines that x or other As have determi-
nates of other targets of inquiry T1,...,Tn.
Put in less complex terms, what makes an A relevantly normal is that
it goes through a theoretically important mechanism for the purposes
of a particular target of inquiry. And what makes the mechanism the-
oretically important is a relational feature, not an intrinsic one. We can
now put this theory to some explanatory work.
For example, we can now explain why practitioners of the special
sciences retain predicates like raven, rather then reﬁning them in order
to be able to use them in formulating straightforward universal gener-
alizations that are causally sustained. If they did that, they would be
stuck with a very large number of predicates that would appear to be
unrelated and hence would not mark out that we are in fact capturing
a signiﬁcant connection among phenomena.
Drawing on the same resources, I now want to account for the
three explananda I listed at the end of §2.3. Why are cp-generalizations
open-ended, why do they change their truth-values in response, and
only in response, to large-scale changes, and how do we account for
the semantic relations we’ve observed?
Recall that a generalization is open-ended just in case the list of
(mere) exceptions is open-ended. Given the semantics I’ve proposed,
something is an exception to the characterizing sentence As are F just
in case it is an A that is neither F nor F-normal. Since what makes
an A relevantly normal is that it is involved in the (or a) theoretically
important mechanism, an A is not normal if it is not involved in this
mechanism, which is to say that it is an A that either never began the
mechanism, for which the mechanism was derailed, or whose outcome
was altered once it ran to completion. Each way of achieving such a
deviation from the theoretically important mechanism will give rise
to a kind of exception to the generalization. And since there are in-
deﬁnitely many ways that the mechanism can be derailed, there are
correspondingly many kinds of exceptions to a given generalization.
For this reason, characterizing sentences are open-ended.
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ate independently of each other. That is to say, the subsets of As that
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do not coincide. That in turn means that the subset needs to depend
on the generalization we are considering. That is just to say that what
counts as relevantly normal needs to depend on the predicate, which
is why what is at issue is not just being a normal A, but being one that
is normal in a respect determined by the predicate. Here, the notion of
a target of inquiry is extremely useful: the respect determined by the
predicate just is the target of inquiry of which that predicate denotes a
determinate. For example, if the predicate is black, then the target of in-
quiry is coloration, and that is just the respect of normality determined
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Finally, we can also account for the fact that at times, there are mul-
tiple ways of being normal, even once we ﬁx on a particular respect.
Suppose that we’re thinking about a particular target of inquiry T, such
as habitat. What makes an A normal with respect to T is the fact that
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nate of T this A has, together with the fact that this causal mechanism
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targets. In the case of habitat, that may be that the presence of the
mechanism is the result of an adaptation. But there may be several
mechanisms that determine a value for T and that all bear the same
relation, e.g., that are all adaptations. And that just means that there
are multiple ways of being normal in the respect of T.
Let me summarize by completing the biconditional.
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tence As are F with target of inquiry TF. Then:
x is an A that is an F-normal A in some way w iff
(i) x is an A, and
(ii) x is involved in a mechanism m that determines that x has
one of the determinates of TF, and
(iii) m stands in a theoretically important relation to mecha-
nisms that determines that x or other As have determi-
nates of other targets of inquiry T1,...,Tn.
Put in less complex terms, what makes an A relevantly normal is that
it goes through a theoretically important mechanism for the purposes
of a particular target of inquiry. And what makes the mechanism the-
oretically important is a relational feature, not an intrinsic one. We can
now put this theory to some explanatory work.
For example, we can now explain why practitioners of the special
sciences retain predicates like raven, rather then reﬁning them in order
to be able to use them in formulating straightforward universal gener-
alizations that are causally sustained. If they did that, they would be
stuck with a very large number of predicates that would appear to be
unrelated and hence would not mark out that we are in fact capturing
a signiﬁcant connection among phenomena.
Drawing on the same resources, I now want to account for the
three explananda I listed at the end of §2.3. Why are cp-generalizations
open-ended, why do they change their truth-values in response, and
only in response, to large-scale changes, and how do we account for
the semantic relations we’ve observed?
Recall that a generalization is open-ended just in case the list of
(mere) exceptions is open-ended. Given the semantics I’ve proposed,
something is an exception to the characterizing sentence As are F just
in case it is an A that is neither F nor F-normal. Since what makes
an A relevantly normal is that it is involved in the (or a) theoretically
important mechanism, an A is not normal if it is not involved in this
mechanism, which is to say that it is an A that either never began the
mechanism, for which the mechanism was derailed, or whose outcome
was altered once it ran to completion. Each way of achieving such a
deviation from the theoretically important mechanism will give rise
to a kind of exception to the generalization. And since there are in-
deﬁnitely many ways that the mechanism can be derailed, there are
correspondingly many kinds of exceptions to a given generalization.
For this reason, characterizing sentences are open-ended.
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The account of the contrast between small scale and large scale
change depends on a point about causal homogeneity I haven’t drawn
attention to so far. The causal mechanism or mechanisms that under-
write being an F-normal A are individuated, in part, by their end-
points.41 Thus, in the example of ravens are black, the process that makes
a raven a normally colored raven is one that a raven cannot go through
without being black. This observation has the consequence that if it’s
true that As are F, then the process that makes an A an F-normal A
(in some way) is such that all As that go through it are F. That in
turn means that once we’ve ﬁxed on the mechanism that makes an A
F-normal, we’ve ﬁxed the truth-value of As are F. There is no further
variation once the mechanism has been ﬁxed. This is the crucial point
for understanding why a change in the truth-value of a characterizing
sentence always requires large-scale changes.
In order for a characterizing sentence As are F to differ in truth-value
when it’s evaluated with respect to two different worlds, the mecha-
nism that makes an A F-normal has to differ between the worlds. As I
just argued, what makes a mechanism the one that certiﬁes an A that
is involved in it as F-normal is the fact that it bears a theoretically im-
portant relation to other mechanisms for other targets of inquiry. And
whether a mechanism bears that relation can only change if there are
large scale changes. For example, if we are dealing with a coloration
mechanism that is normal in virtue of being the result of an adapta-
tion, it can only cease to be the normal coloration mechanism if it is
41. I assume determinism for the mechanisms that can sustain a cp-
generalization, though not in general. This seems to reﬂect how we use
these generalizations. We are extremely reluctant to describe an uncontro-
versially chancy process, even one that is very likely to issue in a particular
outcome, with a categorical cp-generalization, as opposed to one that is
explicitly about chances, likelihoods, or ratios among outcomes. Consider,
for example, a coin and the generalization “tosses of this coin land heads.”
This generalization is unacceptable, even if the coin is quite heavily biased
towards heads. A better way of describing the situation is “tosses of this
coin tend to/usually land heads.”
no longer the result of an adaptation. And that requires a large-scale
change.
We can also explain why we see the asymmetries I drew attention to
in my discussion of Pietroski and Rey (§2.3). There, I noted that ravens
are black is true and ravens are white false, even though there are mech-
anisms that underwrite appropriately restricted universal versions of
each. Hence, the difference between these two characterizing sentences
cannot be explained by saying that there only is a causal mechanism
to underwrite the former. Rather, the difference consists in the rela-
tional features of these mechanisms. Only the one that sustains ravens
are black is appropriately related to other mechanisms instantiated in
the population of ravens, while the one that might sustain ravens are
white is not.
The most interesting data, and the hardest ones to account for, con-
cern the fact that we can turn the false ravens are white into a truth
by appropriately qualifying the subject, as in albino ravens are white.
Here are some of the facts we need to account for. First, albino ravens
are white is a genuine cp-generalization. It tolerates exceptions and has
modal import. It also exhibits asymmetries. It’s false that albino ravens
are black, even if there are a number of albinos that are all painted by
a single mechanism, so that the latter generalization, too, is causally
sustained.
What, then, differentiates the mechanism that leads to white albino
ravens from the mechanism that leads to black albino ravens? If we
tried to simply take over the account that I appealed to in order to
explain why ravens are black is true but ravens are white is not, we’d
be courting disaster. In that case, we would have to say that the reason
that albino ravens are white is true is that the mechanism that sustains the
generalization bears theoretically important relations to other mecha-
nisms that causally sustain generalization such as albino ravens have two
legs, albino ravens have two wings, and so on. But these mechanisms are
the very same ones that causally sustain the corresponding general-
izations about ravens, simpliciter. That, in turn, would entail that the
mechanism that causally sustains the generalization albino ravens are
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The account of the contrast between small scale and large scale
change depends on a point about causal homogeneity I haven’t drawn
attention to so far. The causal mechanism or mechanisms that under-
write being an F-normal A are individuated, in part, by their end-
points.41 Thus, in the example of ravens are black, the process that makes
a raven a normally colored raven is one that a raven cannot go through
without being black. This observation has the consequence that if it’s
true that As are F, then the process that makes an A an F-normal A
(in some way) is such that all As that go through it are F. That in
turn means that once we’ve ﬁxed on the mechanism that makes an A
F-normal, we’ve ﬁxed the truth-value of As are F. There is no further
variation once the mechanism has been ﬁxed. This is the crucial point
for understanding why a change in the truth-value of a characterizing
sentence always requires large-scale changes.
In order for a characterizing sentence As are F to differ in truth-value
when it’s evaluated with respect to two different worlds, the mecha-
nism that makes an A F-normal has to differ between the worlds. As I
just argued, what makes a mechanism the one that certiﬁes an A that
is involved in it as F-normal is the fact that it bears a theoretically im-
portant relation to other mechanisms for other targets of inquiry. And
whether a mechanism bears that relation can only change if there are
large scale changes. For example, if we are dealing with a coloration
mechanism that is normal in virtue of being the result of an adapta-
tion, it can only cease to be the normal coloration mechanism if it is
41. I assume determinism for the mechanisms that can sustain a cp-
generalization, though not in general. This seems to reﬂect how we use
these generalizations. We are extremely reluctant to describe an uncontro-
versially chancy process, even one that is very likely to issue in a particular
outcome, with a categorical cp-generalization, as opposed to one that is
explicitly about chances, likelihoods, or ratios among outcomes. Consider,
for example, a coin and the generalization “tosses of this coin land heads.”
This generalization is unacceptable, even if the coin is quite heavily biased
towards heads. A better way of describing the situation is “tosses of this
coin tend to/usually land heads.”
no longer the result of an adaptation. And that requires a large-scale
change.
We can also explain why we see the asymmetries I drew attention to
in my discussion of Pietroski and Rey (§2.3). There, I noted that ravens
are black is true and ravens are white false, even though there are mech-
anisms that underwrite appropriately restricted universal versions of
each. Hence, the difference between these two characterizing sentences
cannot be explained by saying that there only is a causal mechanism
to underwrite the former. Rather, the difference consists in the rela-
tional features of these mechanisms. Only the one that sustains ravens
are black is appropriately related to other mechanisms instantiated in
the population of ravens, while the one that might sustain ravens are
white is not.
The most interesting data, and the hardest ones to account for, con-
cern the fact that we can turn the false ravens are white into a truth
by appropriately qualifying the subject, as in albino ravens are white.
Here are some of the facts we need to account for. First, albino ravens
are white is a genuine cp-generalization. It tolerates exceptions and has
modal import. It also exhibits asymmetries. It’s false that albino ravens
are black, even if there are a number of albinos that are all painted by
a single mechanism, so that the latter generalization, too, is causally
sustained.
What, then, differentiates the mechanism that leads to white albino
ravens from the mechanism that leads to black albino ravens? If we
tried to simply take over the account that I appealed to in order to
explain why ravens are black is true but ravens are white is not, we’d
be courting disaster. In that case, we would have to say that the reason
that albino ravens are white is true is that the mechanism that sustains the
generalization bears theoretically important relations to other mecha-
nisms that causally sustain generalization such as albino ravens have two
legs, albino ravens have two wings, and so on. But these mechanisms are
the very same ones that causally sustain the corresponding general-
izations about ravens, simpliciter. That, in turn, would entail that the
mechanism that causally sustains the generalization albino ravens are
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white bears theoretically important relations to the mechanisms that
sustain ravens have two wings and ravens have two legs. And that would
entail that the mechanism that leads to white albino ravens is eligible
to certify a white albino raven as a normally colored raven, simpliciter,
so that ravens are white is predicted to be true. That will not do.
Here is my alternative proposal. It crucially exploits the fact that
we’re qualifying the subject term of another generalization by provid-
ing a slightly different account of normality, one that is derivative from
the account of normality appropriate to unqualiﬁed subject terms.
qualified normality Assume that we are considering the character-
izing sentence G As are F with target of inquiry TF, where G
modiﬁes the subject A. Then:
x is a G A that is an F-normal G A in some way w iff
(i) x is a G A, and
(ii) x is involved in a mechanism m that determines that x has
one of the determinates of TF, and
(iii) m is just like a mechanism that determines that a y is an
F-normal A, compatibly with the fact that x is a G.
The core idea of this proposal is that, when we qualify a subject, such
as ravens to yield something like albino raven, we piggyback on the
mechanism(s) that make a raven normal. A mechanism is eligible to
make an albino raven normal just in case it’s as much like the one that
makes a raven normal as possible, given that the mechanism is one
that involves an albino raven.
This proposal serves to explain, for example, why an albino raven
that’s been painted black does not count as a normally colored albino
raven. The mechanism that makes a non-albino raven normally col-
ored excludes the application of paint. And because there is another
mechanism that leads to an albino raven having a color, namely one
that doesn’t involve painting, the mechanism that does involve paint-
ing is not as much like the mechanism that makes ordinary ravens
normal. The proposal also explains why we cannot assign determinate
truth-conditions to cp-generalizations where the subject is qualiﬁed by
abnormal. If all we know about a raven, say, is that it is abnormal, we
don’t know which of the very many mechanisms that are slightly dif-
ferent from the ones that make ordinary ravens normal can causally
sustain the generalization.
This way of solving the problem is a ﬁnal payoff from looking very
closely at the actual language used to frame cp-generalization. If we
tried to state semantics for these generalizations purely in terms of a
regimented formal language, we wouldn’t be able to discern a differ-
ence between the class of ravens and the class of albino ravens. But
by taking the connection between cp-generalizations and natural lan-
guage seriously, we can account for the data.
On the theory I’ve presented, whether a mechanism that sustains
a generalization can qualify the objects involved in it as appropriately
normal depends on whether that mechanism bears theoretically im-
portant relations to other mechanisms sustaining other generalizations.
But which relations are theoretically important depends on the theory
and that suggests that when there are different theories that investigate
the same target phenomena, different mechanisms count as bearing the
theoretically important relations. This prediction of my account is ac-
tually borne out.
Dobermans are born with ﬂoppy ears. In some countries, including
the US, breeders then cut off parts of their ears and temporarily insert
posts in order to make the ears grow in a pointy shape. With that
information in mind, consider the following texts.
biology Some breeds of dogs have evolved to focus on their hearing.
These breeds have pointy ears. Dobermans, however, mostly rely
on their sense of smell, and as that fact might lead you to believe,
Dobermans do not have pointy ears. Dobermans have ﬂoppy ears.
dog-show Welcome to this year’s meeting of the Westminster Kennel
Club. Some of our breeds have a more relaxed, homely appear-
ance, especially those with ﬂoppy ears. Dobermans, however,
are regal. Dobermans do not have ﬂoppy ears. Dobermans have
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white bears theoretically important relations to the mechanisms that
sustain ravens have two wings and ravens have two legs. And that would
entail that the mechanism that leads to white albino ravens is eligible
to certify a white albino raven as a normally colored raven, simpliciter,
so that ravens are white is predicted to be true. That will not do.
Here is my alternative proposal. It crucially exploits the fact that
we’re qualifying the subject term of another generalization by provid-
ing a slightly different account of normality, one that is derivative from
the account of normality appropriate to unqualiﬁed subject terms.
qualified normality Assume that we are considering the character-
izing sentence G As are F with target of inquiry TF, where G
modiﬁes the subject A. Then:
x is a G A that is an F-normal G A in some way w iff
(i) x is a G A, and
(ii) x is involved in a mechanism m that determines that x has
one of the determinates of TF, and
(iii) m is just like a mechanism that determines that a y is an
F-normal A, compatibly with the fact that x is a G.
The core idea of this proposal is that, when we qualify a subject, such
as ravens to yield something like albino raven, we piggyback on the
mechanism(s) that make a raven normal. A mechanism is eligible to
make an albino raven normal just in case it’s as much like the one that
makes a raven normal as possible, given that the mechanism is one
that involves an albino raven.
This proposal serves to explain, for example, why an albino raven
that’s been painted black does not count as a normally colored albino
raven. The mechanism that makes a non-albino raven normally col-
ored excludes the application of paint. And because there is another
mechanism that leads to an albino raven having a color, namely one
that doesn’t involve painting, the mechanism that does involve paint-
ing is not as much like the mechanism that makes ordinary ravens
normal. The proposal also explains why we cannot assign determinate
truth-conditions to cp-generalizations where the subject is qualiﬁed by
abnormal. If all we know about a raven, say, is that it is abnormal, we
don’t know which of the very many mechanisms that are slightly dif-
ferent from the ones that make ordinary ravens normal can causally
sustain the generalization.
This way of solving the problem is a ﬁnal payoff from looking very
closely at the actual language used to frame cp-generalization. If we
tried to state semantics for these generalizations purely in terms of a
regimented formal language, we wouldn’t be able to discern a differ-
ence between the class of ravens and the class of albino ravens. But
by taking the connection between cp-generalizations and natural lan-
guage seriously, we can account for the data.
On the theory I’ve presented, whether a mechanism that sustains
a generalization can qualify the objects involved in it as appropriately
normal depends on whether that mechanism bears theoretically im-
portant relations to other mechanisms sustaining other generalizations.
But which relations are theoretically important depends on the theory
and that suggests that when there are different theories that investigate
the same target phenomena, different mechanisms count as bearing the
theoretically important relations. This prediction of my account is ac-
tually borne out.
Dobermans are born with ﬂoppy ears. In some countries, including
the US, breeders then cut off parts of their ears and temporarily insert
posts in order to make the ears grow in a pointy shape. With that
information in mind, consider the following texts.
biology Some breeds of dogs have evolved to focus on their hearing.
These breeds have pointy ears. Dobermans, however, mostly rely
on their sense of smell, and as that fact might lead you to believe,
Dobermans do not have pointy ears. Dobermans have ﬂoppy ears.
dog-show Welcome to this year’s meeting of the Westminster Kennel
Club. Some of our breeds have a more relaxed, homely appear-
ance, especially those with ﬂoppy ears. Dobermans, however,
are regal. Dobermans do not have ﬂoppy ears. Dobermans have
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pointy ears.
In the context of their respective texts, each of the italicized claims is
true. That shows that the interpretation of these claims depends on the
context in which they are produced. On my account, there is a natu-
ral explanation of what is going on. In biology, the natural kinds are
the kinds of evolution, and any mechanism that involves the actions
of breeders fails to be related to other mechanisms in theoretically im-
portant ways. By contrast, in dog-show, we are precisely interested in
dog-breeding, and hence the mechanisms that involve (at least some
of) the actions of breeders are the ones that contribute to making the
property of being a doberman a natural kind property for that theoret-
ical enterprise.
(23) is another example that supports this account.
(23) Sea-turtles are long-lived.
Sea-turtles reproduce by laying their eggs on the beach. They all hatch
at the same time, and the newborn turtles have to race to the ocean
in order to develop further. On that race to the ocean, most turtles
are eaten by predators who are there, awaiting the turtles’ appearance.
Nonetheless, the mechanism that sustains the generalization focuses
on the slow metabolism of turtles and treats the fact of predation as
abnormal. This follows naturally from my account, since that mecha-
nism is the result of selection—whether it actually comes to fruition in
most turtles or merely a minority is irrelevant. Let me emphasize that
not only is the truth of (23) compatible with my account, my account
is also compatible with the truth of (24).
(24) Sea-turtles lay many eggs.
Because sea-turtles suffer so heavily from predation, they “plan” for
the culling right after birth by laying very many eggs. The mechanism
that sustains this generalization plausibly bears the same theoretically
important relation to other mechanisms involving turtles as does the
mechanism that sustains (23).
The example illustrates several important points. First, one might
have responded to the doberman-example by saying that what ac-
counts for the difference in truth-value is simply the salience of dober-
mans with the relevant shape of ears. Somehow, because we picture a
doberman with ﬂoppy ears, we ﬁnd dobermans don’t have pointy ears to
be acceptable in the context of biology. But such psychological or per-
ceptual salience cannot account for what happens in (23), since even
standing at the beach looking out at the turtles being eaten, we still
ﬁnd (23) acceptable, and sea-turtles die young to be false.
Second, the example speaks against an alternative theory of what
makes a causal mechanism eligible to underwrite a causally sustained
characterizing sentence. One might have said that, in the context of a
particular discipline, a causal mechanism is eligible to so underwrite a
generalization if it is the kind of mechanism studied in the discipline,
and/or it has important effects on the targets of inquiry in that dis-
cipline. However, the predator/prey interaction that causes so many
young turtles to die satisﬁes both of these conditions, and still isn’t
eligible. Clearly, predator/prey interactions are part of what is studied
in evolutionary biology, so it’s the right kind of mechanism. And such
predator/prey interactions also have important effects—for example,
they inﬂuence how many eggs are laid. By contrast, my account deals
with this example neatly, because the slow metabolism of turtles that
causally sustains the generalization (23) is related to other mechanisms
that underwrite other characterizing sentences by being an adaptation.
5. Conclusions
I have offered a new account of how cp-laws ﬁt into the theoretical
aims and demands of the special sciences. To ﬁnd a class of cp-laws
that are properly treated together, I’ve appealed to broadly linguistic
considerations. I’ve argued that some cp-laws are most naturally stated
by the use of characterizing sentences, and that these sentences should
be interpreted in terms of a notion of normality. I then argued that
such a notion of normality can be deﬁned, albeit non-reductively, by
developing resources via consideration of natural kinds in the special
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pointy ears.
In the context of their respective texts, each of the italicized claims is
true. That shows that the interpretation of these claims depends on the
context in which they are produced. On my account, there is a natu-
ral explanation of what is going on. In biology, the natural kinds are
the kinds of evolution, and any mechanism that involves the actions
of breeders fails to be related to other mechanisms in theoretically im-
portant ways. By contrast, in dog-show, we are precisely interested in
dog-breeding, and hence the mechanisms that involve (at least some
of) the actions of breeders are the ones that contribute to making the
property of being a doberman a natural kind property for that theoret-
ical enterprise.
(23) is another example that supports this account.
(23) Sea-turtles are long-lived.
Sea-turtles reproduce by laying their eggs on the beach. They all hatch
at the same time, and the newborn turtles have to race to the ocean
in order to develop further. On that race to the ocean, most turtles
are eaten by predators who are there, awaiting the turtles’ appearance.
Nonetheless, the mechanism that sustains the generalization focuses
on the slow metabolism of turtles and treats the fact of predation as
abnormal. This follows naturally from my account, since that mecha-
nism is the result of selection—whether it actually comes to fruition in
most turtles or merely a minority is irrelevant. Let me emphasize that
not only is the truth of (23) compatible with my account, my account
is also compatible with the truth of (24).
(24) Sea-turtles lay many eggs.
Because sea-turtles suffer so heavily from predation, they “plan” for
the culling right after birth by laying very many eggs. The mechanism
that sustains this generalization plausibly bears the same theoretically
important relation to other mechanisms involving turtles as does the
mechanism that sustains (23).
The example illustrates several important points. First, one might
have responded to the doberman-example by saying that what ac-
counts for the difference in truth-value is simply the salience of dober-
mans with the relevant shape of ears. Somehow, because we picture a
doberman with ﬂoppy ears, we ﬁnd dobermans don’t have pointy ears to
be acceptable in the context of biology. But such psychological or per-
ceptual salience cannot account for what happens in (23), since even
standing at the beach looking out at the turtles being eaten, we still
ﬁnd (23) acceptable, and sea-turtles die young to be false.
Second, the example speaks against an alternative theory of what
makes a causal mechanism eligible to underwrite a causally sustained
characterizing sentence. One might have said that, in the context of a
particular discipline, a causal mechanism is eligible to so underwrite a
generalization if it is the kind of mechanism studied in the discipline,
and/or it has important effects on the targets of inquiry in that dis-
cipline. However, the predator/prey interaction that causes so many
young turtles to die satisﬁes both of these conditions, and still isn’t
eligible. Clearly, predator/prey interactions are part of what is studied
in evolutionary biology, so it’s the right kind of mechanism. And such
predator/prey interactions also have important effects—for example,
they inﬂuence how many eggs are laid. By contrast, my account deals
with this example neatly, because the slow metabolism of turtles that
causally sustains the generalization (23) is related to other mechanisms
that underwrite other characterizing sentences by being an adaptation.
5. Conclusions
I have offered a new account of how cp-laws ﬁt into the theoretical
aims and demands of the special sciences. To ﬁnd a class of cp-laws
that are properly treated together, I’ve appealed to broadly linguistic
considerations. I’ve argued that some cp-laws are most naturally stated
by the use of characterizing sentences, and that these sentences should
be interpreted in terms of a notion of normality. I then argued that
such a notion of normality can be deﬁned, albeit non-reductively, by
developing resources via consideration of natural kinds in the special
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sciences. One point I want to draw attention to is that the claims I’ve
made about natural kinds in the special sciences are very weak. Thus,
my account should be acceptable to theorists with quite different com-
mitments.
Let me ﬁnish by raising two questions. The ﬁrst is how to ex-
tend this treatment to other cp-generalizations, especially ones that
are stated by using habituals, among which there are many ascriptions
of dispositions. The second is how this treatment of characterizing sen-
tences can be extended to non-scientiﬁc contexts. We obviously make
use of characterizing sentences outside of formal scientiﬁc inquiry. My
semantics suggest that, even in these contexts, we should somehow
have the resources to interpret a notion of normality with the structure
I identiﬁed. It is an open question what psychological and epistemo-
logical mechanisms underlie this possibility in the informal context of
everyday life.42
42. This paper has grown out of work in my dissertation, and I’d like to thank
my teachers Ned Hall, Bob Stalnaker, Steve Yablo, and Judy Thomson who
ﬁrst told me to say what I mean by normal. Paul Pietroski, Michael Strevens,
and Alice Ter Meulen all read various drafts of the paper and greatly im-
proved it. I’ve given ancestors of this paper in several venues, and I’d like
to thank audiences at graduate conferences at the University of Colorado,
Boulder, the University of Utah, as well as at colloquia at Dartmouth Col-
lege and the University of Umeå. Finally, I’d like to acknowledge the help
of two anonymous referees for this journal .
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